Mennonite
Central
Committee

Chapter 3: Cluster Munitions Use by Russian Federation Forces in Chechnya

Clusters of Death
Copyright © 2000, Mennonite Central Committee

• Chapter 3: Cluster Munitions Use by Russian Federation Forces in Chechnya

  • The First Chechen War: 1994-1996
    • January 3, 1995, Cluster Bomb Attack on Shali and Other Attacks
    • Use of Grad and Uragan Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
  • Efforts at Unexploded Ordnance Clearance: 1996-1999
  • The Second Chechen War: Renewed Fighting 1999-2000
    • Initial Use of Cluster Munitions: August 1999-October 1999
    • The October 7, 1999, Cluster Bomb Attack on Elistanzhi
    • The October 21, 1999, Cluster Bomb Attack on the Grozny Market
    • Cluster Bomb Use Late October 1999 - Present
    • Additional Use of Grad and Uragan Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
  • International Criticism of the Ongoing Conflict and the Indiscriminate Bombing of Civilians
    • Independent Analysts and Commentators
    • International Human Rights Organizations
    • International Intergovernmental Organizations
  • Notes for Chapter 3

Twenty-five year old "Mohamed" suffered a fractured skull and brain damage and had both legs amputated after an unexploded cluster bomb went off in the village of Novy Sharoy, Achkhoy-Martan district, Chechnya on 23 October 1999, in which around 17 children aged between 10 and 13 were wounded, and seven people died instantly.⁽¹⁾

Russian forces have used cluster munitions extensively in the Chechen conflict, both during the 1994-96 war, as well as the recurrence of hostilities which began in September 1999.⁽²⁾ Reporting on the use and effect of cluster bombs has been incidental to reporting on human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by both sides of the conflict. While Russian leaders harshly criticized the use of cluster munitions by NATO forces as banned under international law, Russian forces have not hesitated to use cluster munitions and other heavy weaponry indiscriminately against combatants and civilians alike.

The entire array of cluster munitions in the Russian arsenal have been deployed in Chechnya: artillery in the form of multiple launch rockets systems (Grad, Uragan, Smerch MLRS), cluster bombs dropped from jet aircraft and helicopters, and tactical missiles such as the SS-21 Tochka.⁽³⁾

In contrast to the NATO/Serbia conflict in Kosovo, where considerable independent investigation by unexploded ordnance removal specialists has allowed for a growing body of literature concerning the operation of NATO cluster munitions, there appears to be a dearth of publicly available data concerning the use and lasting effects of Russian or Chechen submunitions. What follows are accounts gleaned from international and Russian press reports, United Nations documents, human rights organizations, and communications with unexploded ordnance removal agencies. It is not intended as a comprehensive listing of such attacks.

Many cluster bomb attacks apparently have been targeted at civilian areas, where civilians and reporters have indicated that no rebels were present at the time of the attacks. While no comprehensive surveys have been done to document unexploded cluster munitions, clearance specialists have encountered them with regularity, and press accounts and human rights groups have documented many deaths and injuries caused by cluster bomb duds.

The January 3, 1995 aerial cluster bombing of Shali and the October 21, 1999 missile launched cluster bomb attack on the Grozny marketplace offer emblematic instances of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. In the Shali attack, at least 55 people were killed and nearly 200 injured. No rebel fighters were reported in the area at the time of the attack. Several reliable sources reported considerable numbers of unexploded cluster bomblets following the attack. In the missile attack on the Grozny market, at least 137 people died, with many dozens more injured. A myriad of Russian officials offered an equivalent number of garbled explanations and justifications for the attack, first suggesting the explosions were the result of rebel factional fighting before saying that the market was an arms bazaar. Outside observers familiar with the market acknowledge that arms were available at one corner of the sprawling market, but that use of such munitions would inevitably cause massive collateral damage.

The First Chechen War: 1994-1996

January 3, 1995, Cluster Bomb Attack on Shali and Other Attacks

The Chechen war began in late 1994. From the outset, Russian forces employed cluster submunitions. On December 24, 1994, a cluster bomb killed 27 year-old Abdeam Aslam, according to fellow Chechen fighters in Tolstoy-Yurt.⁽⁴⁾

By mid-January 1995, Russian bombing and artillery had killed or injured thousands of civilians.

Thousands of civilians are believed to have died in Grozny, many of them from bomb attacks in which the Russian jets have been using rockets and shells packed with nails and pellets that do only surface damage to concrete buildings but rip through anything or anybody else standing in the way.⁽⁵⁾

On January 3, 1995, the Russian jets repeatedly bombed Shali with cluster munitions. They hit a roadside market first, then the hospital where wounded had been. A Muslim cemetery was also targeted, while a funeral was in process. The village school and a collective farm were also targeted. At least 55 people were killed, and 186 wounded. According to the hospital's chief doctor, Zaur Musliyev, among the dead were five medics killed when a bomb exploded in the operating room, and a new mother when a bomb exploded in the maternity ward (her baby survived). Following the attack, several unexploded baseball sized bomblets were seen by journalists in the hospital courtyard and in the field around the roadside market. According to residents, no Chechen fighters were based in the village.⁽⁶⁾

Shortly after the attacks, Russian lawmaker Aivars Lezdinsk condemned the use of cluster bombs, claiming they were banned under the Geneva Conventions.⁽⁷⁾ Andrei Mironov, a former dissident and an aide to then presidential human rights commissioner Sergei Kovalyov, began collecting evidence of cluster bombs and other ordnance early in the conflict, including a tennis ball sized bomblet he found in Shali following the January 3 attack. According to Mironov, the attack killed over a hundred people, nearly all civilians. "I remember, Soviet propaganda spoke a lot about the Americans, how they were using such weapons in Vietnam. But now they (the Russians) do the same." Mironov said.⁽⁸⁾

One commentator noted on that the use of Grad, Smerch and Uragan multiple rocket launchers, all systems capable of firing cluster submunitions, had done little to affect Chechen fighters, but had caused great suffering and resentment among the civilian population.⁽⁹⁾

On January 11, 1995, Russian Air Force Commander, Col. Gen. Pyotr Deinekin, acknowledged use of cluster bombs, but claimed they were used only against military targets.⁽¹⁰⁾ In mid-January 1995, a BBC television crew narrowly escaped death while witnessing the killing of several people during a cluster bomb attack in Grozny.⁽¹¹⁾

A Chechen doctor in a field hospital south of Grozny, Khamsad Elmurzayev, attested to the horrid injuries caused by cluster bombs: "Hands and legs are torn off from the bombs, large body wounds from the cluster bombs. It is terrible."⁽¹²⁾

In late January 1995, Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev accused Russian forces of "deliberately attacking civilians, using multiple rocket launchers, napalm, cluster bombs, and phosphorous bombs."⁽¹³⁾ Already by January 1995, many prominent Russians criticized the indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexei II and former President Mikhail Gorbachev.⁽¹⁴⁾

The office of the Russian government's human rights investigated the charges of indiscriminate bombing of the civilian population in Chechnya in early 1995. Andrei Mironov, the aide to human rights commissioner Sergei Kovalyov, entered Argun in March 1995 to collect additional evidence of cluster bomb use. He was able to collect six unexploded bomblets, defuse them and get three of them out of the area (the other three were seized by the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, the FSK, the successor to the KGB).⁽¹⁵⁾

Commentator Alexander Zhilin noted in March 1995 that the lack of legal basis for the military action and the complete inefficiency of the Russian military resulted in "irrational violence." "When 'Grad' and 'Uragan' volley fire systems were put into operation," he wrote, "it became clear that casualties among the civilians would be counted in the thousands." He added that "[t]he Russian air force was compelled to perform punitive action maybe for the first time in its history. Use of 'pellet' and 'needle' ammunition to bomb a settlement is forbidden even in international wars."⁽¹⁶⁾

On May 19, 1995, a spokesman from the Russian federal command rejected Chechen charges of use of cluster, phosphorous and vacuum bombs.⁽¹⁷⁾ Following a June 5-11, 1995, delegation to Chechnya, the subcommittee on human rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a stinging report. The document cited "disproportionate use of violence" by Russian federal troops, including the cluster bombing of Gudermes.⁽¹⁸⁾

On August 17, 1995, then Air Force Commander-in Chief Pyotr Deinekin was asked in a interview if Russian military aviation had used pellet and cluster bombs in Chechnya. His response: "I can say one thing for sure: the Russian Air Force did not use any bombs which are prohibited by the international conventions, including those with needles."⁽¹⁹⁾ As no international convention technically prohibits the use of cluster munitions, Deinekin displayed an ability to be truthful without answering the question.

On March 6, 1996, three Russian helicopters reportedly dropped cluster bombs on the Minutka district of Grozny.⁽²⁰⁾ On July 17, 1996, Russian warplanes dropped cluster bombs around the mountain villages of Shatoi and Vedeno. Most civilians had previously fled the area, and no victims were reported.⁽²¹⁾

Russian jets attacked Chechen fighters in an approach to Grozny on August 9 or 10, 1996. In reporting on the attack, a British journalist noted the presence of an unexploded cluster bomb.⁽²²⁾ On August 20, 1996, Russian General Konstantin Pulikovsky gave the people of Grozny 48 hours to leave or face massive aerial and ground bombardment, including use of Uragan and Grad systems.⁽²³⁾

In a report in Defense and Security in 1998, it was reported that "it is now [a] know[n] secret that during the Chechen war the TU-22M3 operational-tactical bombers were used for the so called blanket bombing when whole villages were wiped off the ground."⁽²⁴⁾ According to one report, the Chechen rebels acquired Grad MLRS systems before the outbreak of the war, either through purchase, or by stealing them from Russian warehouses.⁽²⁵⁾

Use of Grad and Uragan Multiple Launch Rocket Systems

Grad and Uragan MLRS systems, capable of carrying either unitary high explosive(HE) warheads or cluster submunition warheads, were used extensively during the 1994-96 conflict. In the incidents noted in this sub-section (January 1995-July 1996), the press reports are not clear as to whether HE or cluster warheads were used, but they bear mention for two reasons: firstly, cluster warheads could have been used, and secondly, Russian forces were criticized for using wide area MLRS systems in general against civilian areas, regardless of the warhead type. Additional investigation into these incidents is merited.

On January 29, 1995, according to the Chechen Information Ministry, Russian forces fired Grad and Uragan launchers on the Aldy and Chernorechye villages on the outskirts of Grozny⁽²⁶⁾

On April 8, 1995, Interfax News Agency reported that Russian forces fired Uragan and Grad rockets on Samashki. According to Agence France Presse, the village had been shelled repeatedly, causing women and children to flee, and leaving only lightly armed men to defend the village.⁽²⁷⁾

Agence France Presse reported that a hill outside the village of Bamut was hit by Grad multiple rocket fire all night on April 24, 1995.⁽²⁸⁾ It was not clear from press reports if cluster warheads were used.

On May 19, 1995, Agence France Presse reported that Russian forces near Grozny "blasted rebel positions along a string of villages backed up against the foothills of the Caucacus mountains" with Grad and Uragan multiple rocket launchers.⁽²⁹⁾

On June 7, 1995, Chechen headquarters reported that federal troops used Grad and Uragan launchers against the forest around Bamut.⁽³⁰⁾ The Chechen Ministry of Information reported that during the evening and night of September 16, 1995, Russian troops fired Grad and Uragan rockets at the villages of Bamut and Yandi.⁽³¹⁾

On July 10, 1996, Russian troops reportedly fired Uragan and Grad rocket launchers in the direction of Shatoi.⁽³²⁾ The following day, Russian troops also shelled the village of Mahkety with Grad and Uragan rocket launchers, At least 18 people were reported killed.⁽³³⁾

Efforts at Unexploded Ordnance Clearance: 1996-1999

Following the end of the first Chechen conflict, landmine and unexploded ordnance clearance started in earnest. In a rare instance of cooperation, in November 1996, a joint Russian, Chechen patrol began clearing. According to one Chechen deminer, "We have enough work for 10 to 15 years."⁽³⁴⁾

Clearance efforts by a British aid agency began after the first war ended and continued through he first few months of renewed fighting in late 1999. In April 1997, the Russian government granted permission to the HALO Trust, a British aid agency, to train local Chechen noncombatants in demining, mark mine fields, and remove unexploded ordnance. Cooperation from Chechen leaders was also secured.⁽³⁵⁾ A preliminary survey conducted by HALO found that through April 1997, at least 27 civilians, half of them children, had been killed by landmines or UXO, with HALO suspecting many more unreported injuries and deaths. About 20,000 hectares of farmland were out of use for fear of mines. HALO deemed UXO in the form of unexploded bombs, rockets and artillery shells as equal in scope to landmines, citing in particular battlefields in the villages of Smashki, Dargo, Stary Achkoi, and Zony.⁽³⁶⁾ HALO had a full clearance program with 150 staff working on manual and mechanical teams between April 1997 and December 1999, in addition to a small medical team in late 1999.⁽³⁷⁾

Between 1997 and 1999, HALO encountered a number of unexploded submunitions in Chechnya, including the AO-2.5RT, the PFM 1S, and the PGMDM (an new version of the PTM1G). The latter two models are usually classified as landmines.⁽³⁸⁾

The Second Chechen War: Renewed Fighting 1999-2000

The Chechen war reignited with a vengeance in September 1999. While both sides to the conflict have been accused of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by human rights organizations and national governments, the Russian federation forces clearly have been the focus of greater condemnations. Russian federation forces have been accused of indiscriminate and intentional shelling and aerial bombing of civilians, summary executions, and forces relocation under threat of bombing.⁽³⁹⁾ We analyze the use of cluster munitions against this backdrop.

Initial Use of Cluster Munitions: August 1999-October 1999

The Chechen situation burst back on the international scene in August 1999, when Chechen fighters led an Islamic uprising in the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan.⁽⁴⁰⁾

On August 9, 1999, several planes bombed the Georgian village of Zemo Omalo in the Akhmeta district, near the Dagestan-Georgian border, injuring three people. Georgian authorities invited Russian military experts to investigate. The Russian investigation established that planes of "unknown type and origin" dropped Soviet made cluster bombs and land mines. While not admitting that Russian planes dropped the bombs, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that the Russian government was ready to pay compensation and to "take the necessary measures to prevent such incidents in the future."⁽⁴¹⁾

At the outset of the conflict, Russian military leaders reportedly were reluctant to use air strikes for fear of civilian casualties. After the first combat encounters where Russian troops suffered heavy losses, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev authorized massive air support for ground troops. Su-24M "Fencer-D" tactical strike aircraft and the Su-25 "Frogfoot" have formed the core of Russian air offensives in Chechnya.⁽⁴²⁾ Heavy clouds, constant haze, mountainous terrain, and limited accuracy have hindered precision bombing by the Su-25.⁽⁴³⁾

In September 1999, Russian military leaders speculated openly about the use of strategic heavy bombers such as the Tu-22M3 "Backfire" bomber, which is capable of delivering cluster bombs and causing as much damage as a regiment of Su-25 bombers. Such speculation was renewed in December 1999, including talk of using the Tu-95MS strategic bomber.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Tu-22M3 bombers and Tu-95MS bombers were ready for deployment, and could each carry up to 1.5 tons of cluster bombs. Izvestia anticipated "anti-Russian campaigns" in response to use of heavy strategic bombing.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The strategy was still under consideration in February 2000, according to Air Force Chief of Staff, Col. Gen. Anatoly Kornukov, who suggested that the Russians may use Tu-22M Backfire aircraft to "carpet bomb" rebel refuges in the mountains.⁽⁴⁶⁾ As of May 2000, heavy bombers reportedly had not yet been used, although training exercises for such use were held in April 2000.⁽⁴⁷⁾

The October 7, 1999, Cluster Bomb Attack on Elistanzhi

On October 7, 1999, two Su-24 fighter bombers dropped eight cluster bombs on the village of Elistanzhi. The cluster bomb attack killed at least 35, mostly women and children, and wounded 60. At least nine children were killed when one bomb hit the local school. According to a western journalist, "a trail of small bomb craters 300 yd long and 70 wide ran through the centre of the village - a total of more than 200 detonations typical of cluster bombs designed to inflict maximum casualties."⁽⁴⁸⁾ A nine month old named Imamshamil lost a foot in the attack.⁽⁴⁹⁾ According to interviews conducted by Amnesty International and Memorial (a Moscow based human rights group), 48 civilians died and over 100 were injured. Among the dead was Imani Muzaeva, a woman in her sixth month of pregnancy. Witnesses and victims "stated that there were no Chechen fighters or military objectives in the village prior to or at the time of the attack."⁽⁵⁰⁾ According to an eyewitness:

At 7:30pm, two airplanes very high up in the sky started to bomb the village, at a time when people were gathering potatoes and maize to be able to survive. Children, old men and the infirm were killed. Now the peaceful picturesque village among the mountains is just a living grave. . ."⁽⁵¹⁾

Andrei Mironov, by this time with the respected human rights group Memorial, visited Elistanzhi shortly after the attack, and found no evidence of a rebel presence. Villagers again denied there being any militants in the town, and Mironov accused the Russian military of attacking peaceful villages to prevent them from becoming rebel bases.⁽⁵²⁾

The October 21, 1999, Cluster Bomb Attack on the Grozny Market

"Blood was everywhere," said Aslan Akhmatov, "There were torn pieces of flesh, legs and hands. Many people were alive, but badly mutilated, and they were screaming quite terribly."⁽⁵³⁾

On October 21, 1999, a Russian cluster bomb attack on the Grozny market killed scores of civilians. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov claimed that the attack had been aimed at the presidential palace and that the Russians had used a tactical missile with cluster bombs. He claimed 282 people were killed, while early reports had claimed about 150 deaths.⁽⁵⁴⁾ According to HALO Trust, 137 people were killed, and among the wounded was a International Red Cross senior local administrator. HALO confirmed that the attack was due to an "airburst device" from a SS-21 missile, not an internal shootout.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Russian officials charged that the market was an arms bazaar. Independent sources did confirm that in one area of the market, arms were sold, but interviews with local residents indicated that it was a general market as well, and one of the few remaining sources for food in the area.⁽⁵⁶⁾ According to HALO Trust,

Grozny market . . . is a great sprawling area of wooden stalls laid out each morning and packed away in the evenings. It is the equivalent of all your department stores rolled into one. Thus you can buy fresh bread, a TV set, a wedding dress, a bag of nails, and an AK-47 in one open area the size of a couple of sports fields. Each section is clearly demarcated and the area where weapons are sold is very small and set right against the edge. The centre of destruction was in the central zone some 150m away from the area set aside for selling weapons. It was right over the clothes and food section. With the use of such munitions in such an area it was impossible not to have foreseen massive collateral damage. (If indeed, we believe that the arms market was the target.).⁽⁵⁷⁾

The "official" story changed several times. On October 22, one Russian spokesperson on television claimed that there had been no Russian military attacks on Grozny on October 21 and suggested the explosions were caused by Chechen fighters. Also on October 22, another Russian spokesperson, on another TV channel, claimed that a Russian special operation had destroyed an arms market in Grozny, and that if any civilians had been killed, it could only have been those involved in selling arms to the "bandits." The Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, also speaking on October 22 but in Helsinki, stated that an explosion had occurred in a weapons market and that fighting between "two warring bandit groups" might have been the cause. He did note that a Russian special operation had occurred, but that it had "no connection to the events which took place in Grozny." The spinning continued on October 23, 1999, when the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Forces stated that there was a special operation by Russian forces, which provoked combat between two rival bandit groups, who then could have set off an explosion in arms warehouse.⁽⁵⁸⁾

On October 26, 1999, General Major Vladimir Shamanov, Commander of the Russian Federal Forces "Zapad" said in a TV interview that the explosions were the result of a Russian attack ordered at the highest levels of command. On October 23, the President of Ingushetia, General Major Ruslan Aushev (a professional military officer and veteran of the Afghanistan war), dismissed the warehouse explosion explanation and said that it was "clear that this was an attack with tactical rockets" as a result of "decisions made at the very top."⁽⁵⁹⁾

Amnesty International criticized the attack as a possible grave breach of Article 51 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions as an indiscriminate attack on civilians. Even though the arms market may have been a legitimate target, the use of high explosive weapons in a market packed with civilians likely failed the principles of discrimination and proportionality.⁽⁶⁰⁾

Amnesty International also documented the human face of the tragedy. Leila Migieva, aged 46, was traveling in a bus that was hit by flying shrapnel from the attack, losing her left hand and left leg. Tousari Esmurzayeva, whose daughter was wounded while selling bread in the market, shared her eyewitness account:

After the first hit, I saw a man who was sitting in a car. His head had been blown off, but his hands were still holding the wheel. Corpses were everywhere in the market. They were lying on the stalls. . .⁽⁶¹⁾

14 year old Sulikhan Asukanova lost her right arm to amputation after being hit during an explosion during the attack. She was hit at about 5pm, which left her arm hanging off her body. Her mother had to take her to three different hospitals before her arm was finally cut off at 10pm.⁽⁶²⁾

Cluster Bomb Use Late October 1999 - Present

On October 23, 1999, an unexploded cluster bomb detonated in the village of Novi Sharoi (also referred to as Novy Sharoy), Achkoy Martan district, killing seven children and wounding at least 15 others. The bomb had been fired the night before during heavy shelling by Russia forces. According to a February 2000 press account by Cox News Service, villagers said that no rebels were in the village at the time of the shelling.⁽⁶³⁾ An earlier report on the incident by Amnesty International reported that the had killed seven people instantly and injured about 17 children between the ages of 10 and 13 in the village. Amnesty also reported that thirty two year old Ali Gunashev and another man identified as "Mohamed" both had their legs amputated as a result of the blast. Mohamed also suffered brain damage.⁽⁶⁴⁾

On October 26, 1999, a multiple rocket launch system Uragan attack using cluster submunitions was launched against a minefield that HALO Trust was clearing. Four deminers were killed in an open area outside a village of no military significance. There were 19 strikes in the minefield, 9 along the baseline.⁽⁶⁵⁾

Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported seeing unexploded bomblets in Shatoi in late October 1999.⁽⁶⁶⁾

According to HALO Trust, on November 6, 1999 at 10am, five civilians were killed when their car was hit by cluster bombs (type AO-2.5RT) just north of Shatoi. They were fleeing the bombing of Argun. Two unexploded bomblets were found on the road, but as the roads winds between a cliff and a river, it was not possible to determine if other bomblets had failed to explode.⁽⁶⁷⁾

The following day, November 7, 1999, Shatoi was hit by air dropped cluster bombs, with two dead and 12 injured. HALO Trust discovered four bomb bodies and a total of 13 unexploded AO-2.5RTs (which were destroyed). Those bomblets were still in first bomb dispenser that had been released. It had struck the hillside just outside the village, suggesting it had been dropped too early and at too low an altitude. Zoni was also hit by cluster bombs on November 7.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Argun was hit by MLRS Grad cluster submunition attack on November 8, 1999, with at least 15 people injured.⁽⁶⁹⁾

In the early morning of November 11, 1999, a man witnessed small bomblets hit two homes on Naberezhnaia street in the town of Shatoi, forty miles south of Grozny, killing 25 year old Anzor Akhmadov and 50 year old Sultan Iangulbaev. The district police station was also hit with a rocket.⁽⁷⁰⁾ HALO Trust personnel witnessed the attack, reporting that at 12:45pm, a surface to surface rocket carrying submunitions was fired into Shatoi, killing two, injuring four, and damaging many houses. The rocket fired was identified as a 9M79-1 SS-21 Scarab 'A'/Tochka. The anti-personnel bomblets remnants discovered had "chocolate block" fragmentation.⁽⁷¹⁾

That same day, November 11, 1999, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Gusarov asserted that federal troops in Chechnya were in compliance with international law in response to allegations by the US State Department of violations of the Geneva Conventions. Gusarov stressed that Washington "should have remembered about the rules of conducting a war in March [of 1999] instead of throwing cluster bombs on Yugoslavia."⁽⁷²⁾ In mid-November, Russian officers alleged that they had intercepted rebel radio broadcasts urging that women and children be brought into the line of fire of Grad rocket attacks, to produce casualties to discredit Russian forces.⁽⁷³⁾

In mid-November 1999, Chechen refugees from the town of Samashki reported that Russian troops had used Grad and Uragan antipersonnel rockets, "spreading showers of shrapnel over a wide area." They noted in particular an attack on October 24, which combined tactical rockets with a Grad shrapnel attack in which many people were killed.⁽⁷⁴⁾

A BBC television correspondent reported visiting Shali in mid-December 1999, the day after a cluster bomb attack on the town center crammed with refugees.⁽⁷⁵⁾

In response to criticism by the foreign ministers of the NATO council of Russian actions in the North Caucasus, the Russian foreign ministry on December 16, 1999 again retorted that those countries that had used cluster bombs against refugees returning to Kosovo were now talking about the protection of human rights in Russia's "anti-terrorist" campaign in Chechnya.⁽⁷⁶⁾

On January 10, 2000, TASS reported that Russian forces bombed rebel bases in the mountainous southern regions of Chechnya.⁽⁷⁷⁾ On January 16, 2000, the Russian military command reported over 120 air strikes around Chechnya, including on Grozny and the Argun Gorge.⁽⁷⁸⁾ On January 25, 2000, Su-24 and Su-25 ground attack jets, as well as helicopter gunships flew more than 250 sorties against Grozny. Ground troops advanced to the center of Grozny backed by intense artillery fire.⁽⁷⁹⁾ Grad and Uragan rocket attacks on Grozny continued on January 27.⁽⁸⁰⁾ While cluster submunitions were not specifically mentioned in these press accounts, use of cluster bombs would not have been inconsistent with past Russian practice.

In February 2000, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported that SS-1C Scud and SS-21 ballistic missiles had been fitted with bomblet submunitions and used during the conflict to kill and injure personnel and destroy soft-skinned vehicles. The SS-1C is an upgrade of the Scud, and has a range of 190mi and a circular error probable (CEP) of 1,500-3,000 feet. The SS-21, which has a 75 mile range, has a CEP of 300-450 feet.⁽⁸¹⁾ The SS-21 is also referred to as the Tochka or Scarab missile. An earlier report noted that over 60 tactical missiles, mainly SS-21 Tochkas but also some SS-1 Scuds, had been used by mid-November 1999 in Chechnya.⁽⁸²⁾

In March 2000, Russian television broadcast images of several tail sections of ballistic missiles used against Alkhan-Kale, whose cluster warheads reportedly killed and wounded many inhabitants. The lethal coverage of such a warhead was reported as 3.5 to 7 hectares.⁽⁸³⁾ The SS-21 Tochka-U ballistic missiles, which carry cluster warheads, can fly up to 120 km. Russian forces reportedly also used the weapons against Grozny, Shali, and other Chechen towns.⁽⁸⁴⁾

There are some indications that Chechen rebels are adapting tactics used by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. The Viet Cong gathered unexploded cluster bomblets dropped by the US Air Force and reused them as booby traps and landmines against US ground forces.⁽⁸⁵⁾ In mid-April, Russian Interior troops carried out special operations in 15 Chechen cities and towns, confiscating weapons and ammunition. Among the seized material were 33 cluster bombs, suggesting that Chechen fighters are collecting unexploded ordnance for combat use.⁽⁸⁶⁾

On April 23, 2000, Russia's military commander in Grozny, Vasily Prizemlin, declared that the city had been cleared of 120,000 landmines and pieces of unexploded ordnance in a period of two months. Another 5,000 devices were reportedly cleared over an area of 6,300 hectares in the Shali district.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Alexander Lebed, head of the Russian national security council, ordered a halt to the attack and negotiated a ceasefire with the Chechen leadership.⁽⁸⁸⁾

In an interview published on May 25, 2000, Alexander Tkachev, Chairman of the Russian Parliamentary committee established to monitor the human rights situation in Chechnya, expressed concern that continued use of Grad MLRS would destroy Chechen crops.⁽⁸⁹⁾

On June 25, 2000, Russian General Gennady Troshev declared the war was essentially over and that Russia would halt large scale bombing and artillery strikes.⁽⁹⁰⁾ That victory was short lived, as the Kremlin announced the following day that the attacks would continue. On June 26, 2000, Su-25 aircraft and attack helicopters resumed attacks on rebel positions. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Russian government spokesman on the war, stated that artillery attacks would continue "but they would be conducted on rare occasions and outside of populated areas."⁽⁹¹⁾ On June 28, 2000, Chechen rebel spokesman Movladi Udugov reported "massive air strikes and rocket strikes" in a confrontation between Russian and rebel forces.⁽⁹²⁾

Additional Use of Grad and Uragan Multiple Launch Rocket Systems

This sub-section records additional accounts of MLRS attacks in Chechnya and Dagestan, where use of cluster submunitions has not yet been confirmed. In light of the confirmed use of cluster submunitions in other attacks, the following attacks merit mention and further investigation. According to HALO Trust, a non-profit British clearance agency, cluster munitions have been used with Uragan rockets, but noted "that the Grads were more frequently used with unitary HE [high explosive] warheads."⁽⁹³⁾

Russian forces used Grad and Uragan MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) to pound two the two Dagestan villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi on September 7, 1999.⁽⁹⁴⁾ On October 5, 1999, Russian federal forces in Dagestan fired mortars and Grad and Uragan rockets at the Nozhai-Yurt and Vedeno districts of Chechnya.⁽⁹⁵⁾

In mid-October, the Chechen village of Bamut came under intense attack by Russian rockets. On October 10, 1999, Grad and Urgan rockets pounded Bamut.⁽⁹⁶⁾ On October 13, 1999, Russian troops again fired Grad and Urgan multiple rocket launchers at 3:30pm at Bamut, where a heavy concentration of rebel fighters was reported.⁽⁹⁷⁾

During the last week of December 1999, Russian forces pounded Grozny with air and land bombardment, including with Grad and Uragan rocket launchers. Between 20,000 and 40,000 civilians were trapped in the city. Russian strategy focused on minimizing its own casualties, in order to avoid a repetition of its disastrous attempt to take the city on New Year's Eve 1994.⁽⁹⁸⁾

On May 19, 2000, a Chechen source reported that the village of Shuani was hit by a Grad volley, which killed six and injured 20.⁽⁹⁹⁾ The same source noted that on June 22, 2000, Uragan MLRS strikes targeted the villages of Borzoy, Khal-Keloy and Aslambek Sheripov, resulting in "considerable casualties among the civilian population."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

International Criticism of the Ongoing Conflict and the Indiscriminate Bombing of Civilians

Independent Analysts and Commentators

According to one Russian defense expert, "The relentless bombardment of residential areas in Chechnya, including the use of cluster warheads, and the recent air attack on a Red Cross convoy are flagrant violations by the Russian military of the 1949 Geneva Convention and its protocols. . . . The problem with the Russian forces in Chechnya is not that they indiscriminately 'carpet-bomb' from the air, but that deliberate and constant attacks on civilian targets are allowed, using an array of different weapons."⁽¹⁰¹⁾

In an opinion piece dated October 10, 1999 in the Toronto Sun, Eric Margolis accused Al Gore of vowing to be tough on Islamic fundamentalism "even if it means helping his friends in the Kremlin shred innocent civilians with 220mm rockets carrying cluster munitions."⁽¹⁰²⁾

Benjamin Lambeth of Rand has criticized the Russian air campaign as "giving airpower a bad name" because of the use of indiscriminate weapons. He claims that in contrast to the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia, in which prevention of collateral damage was of paramount concern, the Russians "are trying to inflict damage to civilian population and structures." As for precision guided munitions (PGMs), Lambeth claimed that very few have been used in Chechnya, and those used were most likely for testing purposes, not to prevent collateral damage.⁽¹⁰³⁾ A direct comparison can be made to the NATO campaign, however, in the desire to avoid as many combat casualties as possible through the use of air power.

International Human Rights Organizations

Human Rights Watch has consistently condemned indiscriminate bombing by Russian forces in Chechnya. In April 2000, it made recommendations to the UN Commission on Human Rights, including its own findings on bombing in Chechnya:

Since the beginning of the conflict, Russian forces have indiscriminately and disproportionately bombed and shelled civilian areas, causing heavy civilian casualties. They have ignored their Geneva Convention obligations to focus their attacks on combatants, and appear to take few safeguards to protect civilians. The shelling of the Grozny market last autumn was but the first example. In the months that followed a carpet-bombing campaign of Grozny and many other towns and villages was responsible for the vast majority of civilian deaths in the conflict in Chechnya. It has devastated many parts of Chechnya and reduced the capital, Grozny, to a wasteland of rubble.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

Amnesty International, in addition to citations mentioned above, has repeatedly called for international investigations into, among other issues, indiscriminate bombing attacks on civilians.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

International Intergovernmental Organizations

From March 31 to April 4, 2000, Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, visited Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Chechnya. In an April 5 report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, she noted among her concerns the accounts of "disproportionate use of heavy armaments in populated areas."⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

On April 25, 2000, the UN High Commission on Human Rights voted 25 to 7, with 19 abstentions, to support requests by the UN Secretary General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe for international involvement in the situation in Chechnya, and called on all parties to the conflict to agree to an immediate cease-fire. It noted its "grave concern" about "the continued violence in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, in particular reports indicating disproportionate and indiscriminate use of Russian military force." It fell short of calling for an international monitoring body, but did call for a broad based national commission to investigate charges of breaches of international humanitarian law and alleged violations of human rights.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Notably, The Commission termed situation in Chechnya a "conflict" and not an "anti-terrorist operation,"⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ thus implicating international humanitarian law principles.

The Russian delegate vigorously opposed the vote, stating that the authors of the resolution were applying a double standard as regarding disproportionate use of force with respect to Chechnya and the bombing of Yugoslavia.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ The representatives for China and Cuba agreed with the double standard argument. The Chinese and Indian representatives highlighted the threats of international terrorism, with China deeming Russia's actions reasonable in light of such a threat. The Chinese representative termed the issue one of "internal concern," and Sri Lanka's representative called the resolution "intrusive," and not the way forward.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

Notes for Chapter 3

1. Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Chechnya, For the Motherland, AI Index: EUR 46/46/99, December 1999.

2. For a strategic/military analysis of both Chechen wars, see the Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network website, "First Chechnya War: 1994-96," http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/chechnya1.htm; "Second Chechnya War: 1999-???," http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/chechnya2.htm.

3. Multiple launch rocket systems (such as the Grad and Uragan) and tactical missiles (such as the SS-21 Tochka) can carry cluster submunition warheads, as well as unitary warheads. The incidents presented below make clear whether not the sources relied upon make clear whether or not cluster warheads were used.

4. ABC World News Tonight, 26 December 1994, Transcript # 4356-4.

5. David Filipov, "In Grozny, Bombs Rain on Sole Source of Water," Moscow Times, 20 January 1995.

6. Sonni Efron, "Survivors Recall Brutal Assault on Chechen Village," Los Angeles Times, 5 January 1995, p. A1; James Rupert, "Civilian Hit Despite Yeltsin Vow," Washington, Post, 5 January 1995, p. A22; James Meek, "Harrowing Account of a Russian Attack," The Scotsman, 9 January 1995, p. 1; "Yeltsin Orders Halt to Air Raids over Grozny," Minneapolis Star Tribune, 5 January 1995, p. A2; Rod Nordland, "These People Can Never be Pacified," Newsweek, 16 January 1995, p. 28.

7. Ron Laurenzo, "Yelstin Lashes Out at Army Bombings," UPI, 6 January 1995.

8. Peter Graff & Graham Brown, "Russian activist collects bombs as evidence against Moscow," Agence France Presse, 12 February 1995. Mironov described the bombs as weighing about 500 kg and containing hundreds of bomblets lined with steel pellets. He also displayed evidence of dart bombs and incendiary bombs. Ibid.

9. Alexander Zhilin, "Russia-Chechnya: Generals lash Grachev over botched intervention," Inter Press Service, 6 January 1995.

10. Fred Hiatt, "Yeltsin May Act to Rein in Military; Air Force Commander Denies President's Order to Halt Bombing was Disobeyed," Washington Post, 12 January 1995, p. A18.

11. ABC News Nightline, 19 January 1995, Transcript # 3564.

12. "Chechens Suffer Under Continued Russian Assault," CNN News, 16 January 1995, Transcript # 755-1.

13. "Chechnya's resolve," (Op-Ed), Washington Post, 30 January 1995, p. A15.

14. George Church, et. al., "Death Trap: The Chechnya War is a Bloody Mess," Time, 16 January 1995, p. 42.

15. Jonas Bernstein, "Sergei Kovalyov's desperate mission," Washington Times, 14 April 1995, p. A21 (Op-Ed). On March 10, 1995, the Russian Duma voted to rescind Kovalyov's appointment as human rights commissioner, largely due to his sharp criticisms of human rights abuses by the Russian military in Chechnya. Ibid.

16. Alexander Zhilin, "One Hundred Days of War in Chechnya," Moscow News, 17 March 1995.

17. Interfax News Agency, "Use of cluster bombs and phosphorous denied by federal troops command," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 May 1995.

18. Vladimir Abarinov, "The Freeze Continues - The Council of Europe's Russia Dossier is Augmented by Hard-Hitting Report on Situation in Chechnya," Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 2 August 1995.

19. "Flights in Dreams and in Reality," Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, 17 August 1995.

20. Alan Philps, "Russian bomb Chechnya after Lone Wolf dies," Daily Telegraph (London), 7 March 1996, p. 11.

21. Stephane Orjolet, "Russians launch massive air raids in Chechnya," Agence France Presse, 18 July 1996.

22. Marcus Warren, "Humiliating defeat for Russians driven out of Grozny," Daily Telegraph (London), 10 August 1996, p. 15.

23. Alastair MacDonald, "Russian general threatens to crush Grozny in 48 hours," Glasgow Herald, 20 August 1996.

24. S. Larionov, "Big Target in the Caucasus," Defense & Security, 13 July 1998, p. 2.

25. "Urban Warfare: Lessons From the Russian Experience in Chechnya - 1994-1995," Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) website

http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/6453/chechnyaA.html.

26. Interfax News Agency, "Chechen spokesman on military situation," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 January 1995.

27. "Russians attack pockets of Chechen resistance," Agence France Presse (Moscow), 8 April 1995.

28. Sebastian Smith, "Russian helicopters, artillery blast western Chechen villages," Agence France Presse (Bamut), 25 April 1995.

29. "Russian presses offensive against southern Chechen strongholds," Agence France Presse (Moscow), 19 May 1995. Russian military sources claimed they were not targeting villages, but at heavily forested hills giving shelter to the rebels. Ibid; see also Yury Golotyuk, "War in Chechnya Flares Up with New Force," Sevodya, 20 May 1995, excerpted in Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 14 June 1995.

30. Interfax News Agency, "Russians shell Chechen positions near Bamut - Chechen source," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 June 1995.

31. Ekho Moskvy News Agency, "Chechen spokesman says three killed in Russian bombing on the 16^th," (17 Sep 95 broadcast), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 September 1995.

32. Alvi Karimov, "Gekhi still bombed, Grad, Uragan, Air Force used in shelling," TASS, 10 July 1996.

33. Alvi Karimov, "'Grad' and 'Uragan' rocket launchers shell Chechnya's Mahkety," TASS, 11 July 1996.

34. Sebastian Smith, "Deadly landmines in Chechnya: 'We've got enough for 15 years,'" Agence France Presse (Grozny), 22 November 1996.

35. Carlotta Gall, "British Experts to Remove Landmines in Chechnya," Moscow Times, 26 April 1997.

36. Carlotta Gall, "Land Mines, Chechnya's Hidden Killers," Moscow Times, 21 May 1997; See also, Olivia Ward, "Empire of Ruin," New Internationalist, September 1997. In the words of Fatima Umarova of the village of Goiskoye, "We have just put our house together after the bombing. But we couldn't do any planting or harvesting because of the mines." Ibid..

37. E-mail from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe dated 9 May 2000.

38. E-mail from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe dated 10 May 2000. In late 1999, HALO clearance specialists also encountered submunitions fired from Uragan rockets and SS-21 missiles, but did not discover any unexploded examples of them. Id.

39. See, e.g., "Russian Forces Continue Pounding Chechen Targets," Human Rights Watch Press Release, 4 November 1999. <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/nov/chechc1104.htm>. ; Daniel Williams, "Russia Tells Chechens, Leave Grozny or Die," Washington Post, 7 December 1999, p. A1.

40. Charles W. Holmes, "In Dagestan, Great Risks for Russia and the Region," Cox News Service, 20 August 1999.

41. Irina Bazhenova, "Russian apologizes to Georgia for village bombing," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 18 August 1999. The evidence tended to suggest that the aircraft were Russian. After the bombing, they reportedly left Georgian airspace and entered Russian airspace. No aircraft in the neighboring countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Turkey had taken off. RIA News Agency, "Russian, Georgian experts to continue investigating village bombing incident," (14 Aug 99 broadcast), BBC Summary f World Broadcasts, 17 August 1999. Georgian officials said that two Soviet-model jets, an Su-25 and a MIG fighter, were identified as dropping the bombs. Associated Press, "Bombing of Georgian Village is Confirmed," New York Times, 15 August 1999, p. 4.

42. Alexey Komorav, "Chechen Conflict Drives Call for Air Force Modernization," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 February 2000, p. 80.

43. Ibid. Four new Su-25Ts (of which only eight exist), with advanced targeting capabilities, have conducted about 20 combat trials in Chechnya using precision guided munitions. These newest aircraft use the "Shkbal" narrow-view optronic target designation system (television coupled with laser range finder/designator), which reportedly allowed pilots to lock on to targets up 20-22km and launch guided bombs or missiles from 2-3km away and 3-4km altitude. The Russians claimed a 1m accuracy for guided bombs, and .5m for missiles. Ibid. It does not appear cluster bombs were used in those tests.

44. "Russia Likely to Use Heavy Bombers Against Rebel Bases in Chechnya," Interfax News Agency, 23 September 1999; Vladimir Yermolin, "Strategic Aviation May Appear in the Sky over Chechnya," Soviet Press Digest (Source: Izvestia), 15 December 1999.

45. Vladimir Yermolin, "Strategic Aviation May Be Used in Chechnya," Izvestia, 15 December 1999, p. 2, reprinted in Defense and Security, 17 December 1999.

46. David A. Fulghum, "Air War in Chechnya Reveals Mix of Tactics," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 February 2000, p. 76.

47. Nikolai Novichkov, "Russian expands strategic bomber fleet on completion of START II ratification," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 May 2000.

48. Owen Matthews, "The Sound and Fury of Russia's War in Chechnya," The Scotsman, 13 October 1999, p. 13; Owen Matthews, "Chechnya: A Fight for Honor," Newsweek International, 18 October 1999. Villagers claimed there were no Chechen fighters in the village, and that the fighter bombers had not been preceded by any spotter planes. Matthews, "Sound and Fury," Newsweek.

49. Owen Matthews, "Battle Shy," Newsweek, 25 October 1999, p. 36.

50. Amnesty International, Russian Federation - Chechnya: For the Motherland - reported Grave Breaches of International Law, December 1999, p. 4 (hereinafter Amnesty International, Chechnya: For the Motherland).

51. Ibid.

52. Associated Press, "Russian atrocities in Chechnya challenged," Corpus Christi Caller-Times, 19 October 1999, http://caller-times.com/1999/October/19/today/national/1815.html. This report states that the attack occurred during "midday Muslim prayers." Ibid.

53. Mayerbek Nunayev & Richard Paddock, "Russian Rockets Reportedly Kill 118 in Chechnya," Los Angeles Times, 22 October 1999,
www.latimes.com/news/nation/updates/lat_chechnya991022.htm.

54. "Russian jets pound downtown Grozny," Deseret News (Salt Lake City), 27 October 1999, p. A4.

55. HALO Trust, "Summary of Incidents in Chechnya," e-mail attachment from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe dated 10 May 2000. Other sources stated that multiple explosions were heard, with a maternity hospital and mosque also being hit. See, e.g., Nunayev & Paddock, and Michael Wines, "Scores Die as Bombs Ravage Chechen Capital," New York Times, 22 October 1999. HALO Trust confirmed that a "missile carrying submunitions hit the market." It did not verify local reports that the maternity hospital was hit with a separate missile. E-mail communication from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor researcher Virgil Wiebe, dated 28 June 2000.

56. Amnesty International, Chechnya: For the Motherland, p. 5.

57. E-mail communication from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor researcher Virgil Wiebe, 20 May 2000 (emphasis added).

58. Amnesty International, Chechnya: For the Motherland, pp. 6-7.

59. Ibid., p. 7.

60. Ibid., p. 7.

61. Ibid., p. 5.

62. Ibid., p. 5-6.

63. Margaret Coker, "Tragedy in Chechnya: A Son's Wish to Play. . . ." Atlanta Constitution & Journal, 6 February 2000, p. 7C.

64. Amnesty International, "Chechnya: Amnesty International Appeals to the OSCE," in M2 Presswire, 18 November 1999; See also Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Chechnya, For the Motherland, AI Index: EUR 46/46/99, December 1999. A photo of a hospitalized victim of the attack following a double amputation of his legs can be viewed at the Amnesty website - http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/chechnya/pictures.html.

65. E-mail communication from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe dated 10 May 2000, and e-mail attachment "Summary of Incidents in Chechnya"; E-mail communication from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe, dated 28 June 2000.

66. "Russian Forces Fire on Fleeing Civilians," Human Rights Watch Press Release, 18 November 1999. <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/nov/chech1118.htm> .

67. E-mail from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe dated 10 May 2000, and e-mail attachment "Summary of Incidents in Chechnya."

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. "Russian Forces Fire on Fleeing Civilians," Human Rights Watch Press Release, 18 November 1999. <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/nov/chech1118.htm> .

71. E-mail from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe dated 10 May 2000, and e-mail attachment "Summary of Incidents in Chechnya."

72. "Chechnya is Russia's internal affair, says Russian diplomat," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 11 November 1999, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 November 1999. Interfax News Agency quoted Gusarov slightly differently, who was quoted as saying that the US should have remembered "the rules for warfare in March [of 1999] before dropping banned cluster bombs on Yugoslavia . . ." "OSCE Wants 'Serious' Assistance for Chechen Refugees," Interfax Russian News, 11 November 1999.

73. Anatoly Yurkin, "Army group in Chechnya determined to win," TASS, 11 November 1999.

74. David Filipov, "Russian bombardment sows terror in town," Boston Globe, 13 November 1999, p. A1. While this article does not specifically mention cluster submunitions, its eyewitness accounts suggest their use.

75. Raisa Talkhanova, "Families Try To Get On With Life Amid Carnage," The Independent (London), 17 December 1999, p. 13.

76. "Moscow Blasts NATO's Statement on Chechnya," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 16 December 1999. Pavel Baev, a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute in OSLO, has also noted that NATO has undermined its moral integrity in using cluster bombs in Kosovo. Pavel Baev, "West Can't Oppose War," Moscow Times, 7 December 1999.

77. "Chechen Rebels Stage New Attacks on Russians," Reuters, 10 January 2000.

78. Ruslan Musayev, "Russian Jets Pummel Chechen Capital," Associated Press, 16 January 2000.

79. Daniel Williams, "Russian Losses Climb in Battle for Grozny," Washington Post, 26 January 2000, p. A20.

80. "Federal artillery, aviation pound Grozny, fighting underway in town," Interfax News Agency, 27 January 2000.

81. Fulghum, "Air War in Chechnya Reveals Mix of Tactics," Aviation Week & Space Technology.

82. David C. Isby, "Tochka upgrade announced," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 December 1999.

83. Pavel Felgenhauer, "Federal Forces Seal Off Grozny, Raze Ruins," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 15 March 2000, Vol. 52, No. 7, p. 5 (source: "Commentary of the Week," Ekho Moskvy Radio, 13 March 2000).

84. Pavel Felgenhauer, "Defense Dossier: War Criminals Bury Grudge," Moscow Times, 17 February 2000.

85. Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing (Zed Press, London, 1995), p.114, citing to Chief Warrant Officer Swearington, Staff Study on Pernicious Characteristics of US Explosive Ordnance (US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1969), p.169.

86. Pavel Koryashkin, "Russian aircraft make 19 flight to bomb Chechen rebels," TASS, 12 April 2000.

87. "Russian forces crack down on Chechen warlords," United Press International (Moscow), 23 April 2000.

88. David Hoffman, "Jubilant and Dejected Survive in Grim Grozny," Washington Post, 24 August 1996, p. A1; Michael Specter, "Top Yeltsin Aide and Chechen Foes Sign a Peace Pact," New York Times, 23 August 1996, p. A1.

89. Nikolai Zenkovich, "Don't Shell Chechnya's Future Crops," Parlamentskaya Gazeta, p. 4, reprinted in What The Papers Say, 25 May 2000.

90. "Military Operations in Chechnya almost over, General says," Chicago Tribune, 26 June 2000, p. 6.

91. Michael Gordon, "Russia Reverses General's Move to End Attacks in Chechnya," International Herald Tribune, 27 June 2000, p. 1.

92. "Fighting Rages in Chechnya," Reuters (Moscow), 28 June 2000.

93. E-mail communication from HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor Researcher Virgil Wiebe, dated 28 June 2000.

94. Fyodor Zavyalov, "Federal Troops Pounding Guerilla Strongholds," TASS, 7 September 1999.

95. "Federal Troops Resume Attacks on Chechnya," Interfax News Agency, 5 October 1999.

96. Interfax News Agency, "Russian Reports Control of Chechen town, Use of 'medium range' missiles," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 October 1999. Use of medium range tactical missiles was also reported, but it was not clear if cluster munition warheads were used on those missiles. Ibid.

97. Nikolai Topuria, "Fierce clashes as Russian troops thrust deeper into Chechnya," Agence France Presse (Bamut), 14 October 1999. The Chechen general staff claimed that for the whole of Chechnya, over 2,000 civilians had been killed and another 8,000 injured since the start of fighting. It also claimed that 40 villages had been completely destroyed and another 130 seriously damaged. Ibid.

98. Christophe Beauduffe, "Mindful of past disaster, Russians take latest assault on Grozny slowly," Agence France Presse (Moscow), 27 December 1999; Avli Zakriyev, "Russia threatens Chechnya with bigger weapons," Agence France Presse (Nazran), 30 December 1999.

99. Kavkaz-Tsentr web site, "Chechen website reports heavy losses among civilians in mountainous villages," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 May 2000. The source also noted that Russian aircraft were targeting civilian transport in the mountains. Ibid.

100. Kavkaz-Tsentr web site, "Rebel website alleges murders of civilians by federal forces," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 June 2000.

101. Pavel Felgenhauer, "DEFENSE DOSSIER: Is Victory Really the Goal?," The Moscow Times, 4 November 1999.

102. Eric Margolis, "A New Low for Bill Clinton,"(Opinion), Toronto Sun, 10 October 1999, p. C24 .

103. Fulghum, "Air War in Chechnya Reveals Mix of Tactics," Aviation Week & Space Technology.

104. Human Rights Watch, "Recommendations to the UNHCR: Chechnya," April 2000, www.hrw.org/campaigns/geneva/chechnya.htm.

105. Amnesty International Press Release, "Chechnya: The Council of Europe must support an international investigation into human rights abuses," 3 April 2000, www.amnesty.org/news/2000/44602400.htm .

106. "Federation to Investigate Allegations of Human Rights Abuses in Chechnya," UN Press Release, Commission on Human Rights, 56^th session, 5 April 2000 (afternoon), p. 3.

107. Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, E/CN.4/RES/2000/58, 25 April 2000("UNCHR Resolution 58"); UN Press Release, Commission on Human Rights, 56^th session, 25 April 2000 (afternoon), p. 8-9. ("UN Press Release"); Bill Nichols, "U.N. board blasts Russia on Chechnya," USA Today, 26 April 2000, p. 11A.

108. UNCHR Resolution 58; Konstantin Pribytkov, "UN commission approves anti-Russian resolution on Chechnya," TASS, 25 April 2000.

109. UN Press Release, p. 9; "Russian Minister accuses foreign bodies of double standards on Chechnya," Interfax News Agency, 26 April 2000, reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 April 2000.

110. UN Press Release, pp. 9-11.